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1 Introduction
Strategy-proofness, which requires right incentives for agents to reveal their true pref-
erences, is a major desideratum in the design of object allocation mechanisms. In terms
of positive economics, a lack of strategy-proofness undermines the allocative performance
of a mechanism. In normative ground, on the other hand, non strategy-proof mechanisms
may favor strategic agents at the expense of sincere ones (see Pathak and So¨nmez (2008));
hence fairness would be a concern. Market practitioners pay attention to strategy-proofness,
and indeed, in some matching markets, the previously used manipulable mechanisms have
been replaced with strategy-proof ones. Some of such examples are Boston, Chicago, and
Wake County school-choice programs (see Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2005b), Pathak and So¨nmez
(2013), Dur et al. (2017)).
Individual rationality is another fundamental property. Agents are often free to opt out
of an object assignment and go with their outside option. Individual rationality guarantees
agents to be at least as better off as they would be with their outside option.1 In other
words, it rationalizes agents participation in an object assignment.
In the design of object allocation mechanisms, another natural desideratum may be
maximizing the number of assigned agents. This objective becomes most apparent in organ
exchanges as it means maximizing the number of transplants (see Roth et al. (2005) and
Ergin et al. (2017)). It also significantly matters in a matching of asylum seekers to countries
(see Andersson and Ehlers (2016)) as well as dorm assignments in colleges. Maximality is
important for school choice programs as well. As described in Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2005a),
one of the main problems of the old New York City high school match system was that a large
proportion of students were remaining unassigned under the normal process. These students
then, through an administrative process, were placed at schools, which were not necessarily
stated in their preferences. Maximality is indeed the primary goal in some school-choice
programs, as indicated by the following quote from the Frankfurt and North Rhine-West
1More formally, a matching is individually rational if agents never would rather receive no object.
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secondary school districts in Germany:
“The organization of the “Frankfurt School Mechanism” is shared between State,
city and school. Its primary goal is to give as many applicants as possible one of
their preferred schools. Each school decides for itself which students to admit...”
(Basteck et al., 2015).
In this paper, we focus on these three desiderata and study whether we can improve a
given benchmark mechanism in terms of the number of assigned agents through an indi-
vidually rational and strategy-proof mechanism. More formally, we say that a mechanism
size-wise dominates another mechanism if the latter never assigns more agents than the
former does, while the converse holds at some problem.
Our main result shows that for any given benchmark mechanism that satisfies certain
arguably mild properties,2 there is no individually rational and strategy-proof mechanism
that size-wise dominates the former. As the well-known deferred-acceptance (DA), serial
dictatorship (SD), and Boston (BM) mechanisms satisfy all these properties, neither of
them is size-wise dominated by an individually rational and strategy-proof mechanism. This,
along with the strategy-proofness of SD and DA, spells out that if a market designer’s three
goals are individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and maximizing the number of assigned
agents, then SD and DA are unbeatable. We also show that the impossibility result is tight
in the sense that it does not hold without either individual rationality or strategy-proofness.
Above result does not say anything about the other well-known top trading cycles (TTC)
mechanism as TTC does not satisfy all the benchmark axioms. However, we obtain that
whenever the number of agents does not exceed the total number of object copies, no group
strategy-proof and efficient mechanism,3 such as TTC, is size-wise dominated by an individ-
ually rational and strategy-proof mechanism that also satisfies a weak solidarity condition.
2These properties are non-wastefulness, extension-responsiveness, and truncation invariance. They are
all defined in Section 2.
3A mechanism is group strategy-proof if no group of agents benefit from misreporting their preferences.
A mechanism is efficient if its outcome is never unanimously less preferred to another matching.
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To our knowledge, this is the first paper that provides a general axiomatic analysis for a
mechanism comparison in terms of the number of assigned agents. In a recent study, Afacan
et al. (2017) demonstrate that there is no size-wise domination relation between any pair of
TTC, SD, BM , and stable mechanisms, which is partly implied by our main result. Kesten
and Kurino (2016) show that no strategy-proof mechanism Pareto dominates DA.4,5 This
result is then generalized by Alva and Manjunath (2017) and Hirata and Kasuya (2017).
The former shows that there exists at most one strategy-proof mechanism that improves the
agents’ welfare relative to any individually rational and participation-maximal mechanism.
In a more general matching with contracts setting, Hirata and Kasuya (2017) obtain that no
individually rational and strategy-proof mechanism Pareto dominates a stable and strategy-
proof rule.
2 Model
Let I and O be the finite sets of agents and objects, respectively. Each agent has a strict
preference relation over the objects and being unassigned option, which is denoted by ∅. Let
P = (Pi)i∈I be the preference profile of the agents where Pi is the preference relation of agent
i. Let Ri be the weak preference relation associated to Pi such that for any c, c
′ ∈ O, cRic′ if
and only if cPic
′ or c = c′. An object c is acceptable to agent i if cPi∅, and unacceptable
otherwise. For any I ′ ⊂ I, let PI′ = (Pi)i∈I′ and P−I′ = (Pi)i∈I\I′ . Each object c ∈ O can
come with multiple copies, and qc is the number of object c copy. Let q = (qc)c∈O.
An object allocation problem is a 4-tuple (I, O, P, q). In the rest of the paper, we fix I,
O, q, and denote the problem with P . A matching µ : I → O ∪ {∅} is a function such that
for each object c ∈ O, |µ−1(c)| ≤ qc. For any k ∈ I∪O, we write µk to denote the assignment
of k. Let |µ| = |{i ∈ I : µi 6= ∅}|, that is, the number of agents assigned to an object under
4A mechanism Pareto dominates another one if the latter’s outcome is never strictly preferred by some
agent to the former’s, while the converse holds at some problem.
5This result generalizes both results of Kesten (2010), which shows that no efficient and strategy-proof
mechanism Pareto dominates DA, and of Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2009), which, under the presence of an
outside option, obtains the same conclusion with Kesten and Kurino (2016)’s result.
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µ. We call it “size” of matching. A matching µ is individually rational if for any agent
i ∈ I, µiRi∅. A matching µ is non-wasteful if there does not exist an agent-object pair
(i, c) such that cPiµi and |µc| < qc. A matching µ is efficient if there is no matching µ′ such
that for any agent i ∈ I, µ′iRiµi, with this holding strictly for some agent.
A mechanism ψ is a procedure that selects a matching in any problem P . The matching
selected by mechanism ψ in problem P is denoted by ψ(P ). Mechanism ψ is individually
rational (efficient) <non-wasteful> if, for any problem P , ψ(P ) is individually rational (effi-
cient) <non-wasteful>. Mechanism ψ is strategy-proof if there exist no problem P , agent
i, and P ′i such that ψi(P
′
i , P−i)Piψi(P ). Mechanism ψ is group strategy-proof if there
exist no problem P , group of agents I ′ ⊆ I, and false preference profile P ′I′ such that for each
agent i ∈ I ′, ψi(P ′I′ , P−I′)Riψi(P ), with this holding strictly for some agent j ∈ I ′. Here is
our size comparison criterion. A mechanism ψ size-wise dominates mechanism φ if, for
every problem P , |ψ(P )| ≥ |φ(P )|, and |ψ(P ′)| > |φ(P ′)| for some problem P ′.
We next introduce the properties for a benchmark mechanism. A preference relation P ′i
is the truncation of Pi from object c if, for any pair of objects c
′, c′′, c′Pic′′ if and only if
c′P ′i c
′′, and for any c′ such that cPic′, ∅P ′i c′. Mechanism ψ is truncation-invariant if, for any
problem P and agent i such that ψi(P ) 6= ∅, ψ(P ) = ψ(P ′i , P−i) where P ′i is the truncation
of Pi from ψi(P ). Truncation-invariance is a well-studied property requiring the assignment
to remain the same after an agent truncates his preferences below his assignment. DA is
truncation-invariant (Ehlers and Klaus, 2016). It is immediate to see from their definitions
that SD, TTC, and BM are all truncation-invariant as well.6
For an object c, a preference relation P ′i is the object c extension of Pi if, for any
c′, c′′ ∈ O\{c}, c′Pic′′ if and only if c′P ′i c′′, ∅Pic, and object c is the least preferred acceptable
object under P ′i . Mechanism ψ is extension-responding if, for any problem P , agent i,
and object c such that ψi(P ) = ∅ and |ψc(P )| < qc, ψi(P ′i , P−i) = c and ψj(P ′i , P−i) = ψj(P )
for every j ∈ I \ {i} where P ′i is the object c extension of Pi. To our knowledge, this is a
6The definitions of these mechanisms are provided in Appendix A.
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new property. It basically requires an originally unassigned agent to receive a leftover object
after he starts demanding it while the others remain unaffected. It is easy to verify that DA,
BM , and SD are all extension-responding.
3 The Results
Now, we are ready to present our main result, which indicates that any non-wasteful,
truncation-invariant, and extension-responding mechanism cannot be size-wise dominated
by an individually rational and strategy-proof mechanism.
Theorem 1. Let ψ be a non-wasteful, truncation-invariant, and extension-responding mech-
anism. Then, there is no individually rational and strategy-proof mechanism that size-wise
dominates ψ.
Proof. See Appendix B.
More explicitly, Theorem 1 implies that for any non-wasteful, truncation-invariant, and
extension-responding mechanism ψ, and an individually rational and strategy-proof mecha-
nism φ, either |ψ(P )| = |φ(P )| for every P or |ψ(P ′)| > |φ(P ′)| for some P ′.
As aforementioned, DA, SD, andBM are all truncation-invariant and extension-responding.
They are all non-wasteful as well. Hence, as a corollary of Theorem 1, we obtain that neither
of them is size-wise dominated by an individually rational and strategy-proof mechanism.
Moreover, this coupled with the well-known rural hospital theorem (Roth, 1984) generalizes
it to the set of all stable mechanisms.7
Corollary 1. There is no individually rational and strategy-proof mechanism that size-wise
dominates any of BM , SD, and a stable mechanism.
It is well-known that TTC, SD, and DA are all individually rational and strategy-proof.
Hence, we also have the following result, which is independently obtained by Afacan et al.
(2017) as well.
7Rural hospital theorem says that the number of assigned agents is the same under any stable matching.
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Corollary 2. Neither of BM , SD, DA is size-wise dominated by any of TTC, SD, and
DA.
Theorem 1 is tight in the sense that the impossibility does not hold without either
individual rationality or strategy-proofness. For instance, let us consider a mechanism such
that in every problem, it assigns each object to the same group of agents in a way that
either all the agents receive an object or no object is leftover. It is easy to see that this
mechanism is strategy-proof and that size-wise dominates all DA, SD, and BM . Yet, it is
not individually rational. On the other hand, consider a mechanism that always assigns as
many agents as possible subject to individual rationality. Such a mechanism is individually
rational and size-wise dominates all DA, SD, and BM . Yet, it is not strategy-proof.8
Remark 1. BM and stable mechanisms take an object priority profile over agents as
an input of the problem. However, our setting and results are priority-free. In other words,
all of our results hold for any priority ordering. Therefore, Corollary 1 holds for BM and
any stable mechanism with any priority ordering. Likewise, SD uses an agent ordering. We
do not specify any such ordering as well. Therefore, the result above holds for SD with any
agent ordering. By the same token, Corollary 2 holds for any priority and agent ordering.9
Theorem 1 does not say anything about TTC as it is not extension-responding.10 While
we do not know whether TTC is size-wise dominated by an individually rational and strategy-
proof mechanism, we obtain a similar result below by adding another axiom.
8To see this, let us consider I = {i, j} and O = {a, b}, each with unit quota. The preferences are such
that Pi = Pj : a, b, ∅. Let ψ be a mechanism that assigns as many agents as possible subject to individual
rationality. In this problem, without loss of generality, suppose ψi(P ) = a and ψj(P ) = b. Then, under ψ,
agent j can obtain object a by reporting false preferences P ′j under which only object a is acceptable.
9More explicitly, Corollary 2 shows that none of BM and DA under any priority ordering and SD under
any agent ordering is size-wise dominated by any of TTC and DA under any priority ordering, and SD
under any agent ordering.
10In order to see this, let us consider I = {i, j, k} and O = {a, b}, each with unit quota. The preference
profile P is as follows: Pi = Pj : a, ∅, and Pk : ∅. Let us denote the objects’ strict priority orders by
= (c)c∈O. They are as follows: a: k, i, j and b: j, k, i. The TTC outcome at P is such that
TTCi(P ) = a and TTCj(P ) = TTCk(P ) = ∅. Let us now consider P ′k : b, ∅ and write P ′ = (P ′k, P−k). The
TTC outcome at P ′ is such that TTCi(P ′) = ∅, TTCj(P ′) = a, and TTCk(P ′) = b. Hence, TTC is not
extension-responding.
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A mechanism ψ is weakly population-monotonic if, for any problem P and agent
i such that ψi(P ) = ∅, we have ψj(P ′i , P−i)Rjψj(P ) for each j ∈ I \ {i} where P ′i is such
that ∅P ′i c for any c ∈ O. In words, after an originally unassigned agent stops demanding an
object, weak population-monotonicity requires the other agents be at least as better off as
before. This is a weaker version of the well-studied population monotonicity condition.11 DA
is population monotonic (Kojima and Manea, 2010), hence weakly population-monotonic.
It is easy to verify that BM , SD, and TTC are all weakly population-monotonic.
Theorem 2. Let Σc∈Oqc ≥ |I|. Let ψ be an efficient and group strategy-proof mechanism.
Then, there is no individually rational, weakly population-monotonic, and strategy-proof
mechanism that size-wise dominates ψ.12
Proof. See Appendix B.
As TTC is efficient and group strategy-proof, we have the following corollary.13
Corollary 3. Let Σc∈Oqc ≥ |I|. Then, TTC is not size-wise dominated by an individually
rational, weakly population-monotonic, and strategy-proof mechanism, such as SD and DA.
When each object has only one copy, the class of trading cycles of Pycia and U¨nver
(2017), including the hierarchial exchange rules of Pa´pai (2000), are efficient and group
strategy-proof. Hence, we also have the following result.
Corollary 4. Let qc = 1 for each object c ∈ O and |O| ≥ |I|. Then, no trading cycles of
Pycia and U¨nver (2017), hence, in particular, no hierarchial exchange rule of Pa´pai (2000), is
11A mechanism is population monotonic if, after an agent stops demanding an object, no one else becomes
worse off.
12By following the steps of the proof of Theorem 2, we can also straightforwardly show that no efficient
and group strategy-proof mechanism is size-wise dominated by BM .
13Although Pa´pai (2000) obtains the group strategy-proofness of TTC in a unit-copy object allocation
setting, her results easily imply it holding in the multi-copy case as follows. A mechanism ψ is non-bossy if,
for any problem P , agent i, and P ′i , ψi(P
′
i , P−i) = ψi(P ), then ψ(P
′
i , P−i) = ψ(P ). Pa´pai (2000) shows that
TTC is non-bossy. It is immediate to see that TTC is non-bossy in the multi-copy object case as well. She
also obtains that non-bossiness and strategy-proofness is equivalent to group strategy-proofness (the proof
of this result does not rely on the unit-copy assumption). Hence, these, along with the strategy-proofness of
TTC, shows that TTC is group strategy-proof in the current multi-copy object assignment model.
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size-wise dominated by an individually rational, weakly population-monotonic, and strategy-
proof mechanism.
Any mechanism under which each agent always receives the same assignment and no agent
is left unassigned unless all the objects are exhausted is strategy-proof, weakly population-
monotonic, and that size-wise dominates TTC. Yet, it is not individually rational. Let
us consider a mechanism such that it always assigns as many agents as possible subject to
individual rationality and no unassigned agent can alter the outcome by not demanding any
object. This mechanism is individually rational, weakly population-monotonic, and size-
wise dominates TTC; yet it is not strategy-proof (see Footnote 8). We do not know whether




Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (DA)
Let us fix a priority ordering for the objects. Then, DA runs as follows.
Step 1. Each agent applies to his best acceptable object. Each object tentatively accepts
the highest priority applicants one by one up to its capacity and rejects the rest.
In general,
Step k. Each rejected agent applies to his next best acceptable object. Each object
tentatively accepts the highest priority agents among the tentatively accepted and currently
applying agents one by one up to its capacity and rejects the rest.
The algorithm terminates whenever every agent is either tentatively accepted or has
gotten rejection from all of his acceptable objects. The assignments in the terminal round
realize as the final DA outcome.
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Boston Mechanism (BM)
For a fixed priority ordering of the objects, BM works as follows.
Step 1. Each agent applies to his best acceptable object. Each object permanently
accepts the highest priority applicants one by one up to its capacity and rejects the rest.
In general,
Step k. Each rejected agent applies to his next best acceptable object. Each object
permanently accepts the highest priority applicants up to its remaining capacity and rejects
the rest.
The algorithm terminates whenever each agent is either permanently accepted or has
gotten rejection from all of his acceptable objects. The assignments in the terminal round
realize as the final BM outcome.
Top Trading Cycles Mechanism (TTC)
For a fixed priority profile of the objects, TTC runs as follows.
Step 1. Each agent points to his best acceptable object. Each object points to the
highest priority agent. As everything is finite, there exists a cycle. Assign the agents in
these cycles to the objects they are pointing to. The assigned agents leave the problem, and
each assigned object’s capacity is decreased by one.
In general,
Step k. Each agent points to his best acceptable object with a remaining capacity. Each
object points to the highest priority remaining agent. As everything is finite, there exists a
cycle. Assign the agents in these cycles to the objects they are pointing to. The assigned
agents leave the problem, and each assigned object’s capacity is decreased by one.
The algorithm terminates whenever each agent receives an object or all of his acceptable




For a fixed agent ordering, SD runs as follows.
Step 1. The first agent in the ordering chooses his best acceptable object. The chosen
object’s capacity is decreased by one.
In general,
Step k. The kth agent in the ordering chooses his remaining best acceptable object. The
chosen object’s capacity is decreased by one.
The algorithm terminates after the choice-turn of the last agent in the ordering. The
chosen objects are the final SD assignment of the agents.
Appendix B
Lemma 1. Let ψ be a non-wasteful mechanism. If, for any problem P and individually ratio-
nal mechanism φ, |ψ(P )| < |φ(P )|, then there exists an agent i such that ψi(P )Piφi(P )Pi∅.
Proof. Let ψ and φ be a non-wasteful and individually rational mechanisms, respectively.
Suppose |ψ(P )| < |φ(P )| for a problem P . Then, there exists an object c ∈ O such that
|ψc(P )| < |φc(P )| ≤ qc. Let i ∈ φc(P ) \ ψc(P ). As φ is individually rational, cPi∅. On the
other hand, the non-wastefulness of ψ and |ψc(P )| < qc imply that ψi(P )Pic. Therefore, we
have ψi(P )PicPi∅, where φi(P ) = c, which finishes the proof.
Lemma 2. Let ψ be a non-wasteful mechanism. For a problem P and an individually rational
mechanism φ, if |ψ(P )| = |φ(P )| and there exists no agent i such that ψi(P )Piφi(P )Pi∅, then
|ψc(P )| = |φc(P )| for every object c.
Proof. Let ψ and φ be a non-wasteful and individually rational mechanisms, respectively.
In a problem P , suppose that |ψ(P )| = |φ(P )| and there exists no agent i such that
ψi(P )Piφi(P )Pi∅.
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If there exists an object c such that |ψc(P )| > |φc(P )|, then, as |ψ(P )| = |φ(P )|, there
exists another object d such that |ψd(P )| < |φd(P )|. Hence, without loss of generality, assume
for a contradiction that |ψd(P )| < |φd(P )| for some object d. This implies that there exists
an agent i ∈ φd(P ) \ ψd(P ). From the individual rationality of φ, dPi∅. Because ψ is non-
wasteful and |ψd(P )| < qd, it implies that ψi(P )Pid. Hence, these show that ψi(P )PidPi∅,
where d = φi(P ), contradicting our starting supposition.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let ψ be a non-wasteful, truncation-invariant, and extension-responding
mechanism. Assume for a contradiction that an individually rational and strategy-proof
mechanism φ size-wise dominates ψ. Let P be a problem such that |ψ(P )| < |φ(P )|. We
prove the result in two steps.
Step 1. In this step, we construct a preference profile in which there exists no agent
who is assigned under both mechanisms’ outcomes while preferring his assignment under ψ
to that under φ.
As |ψ(P )| < |φ(P )|, from Lemma 1, there exists an agent i such that ψi(P )Piφi(P )Pi∅.
Let P ′i be the truncation of Pi from ψi(P ). Let us write P
′ = (P ′i , P−i). From the truncation-
invariance of ψ, we have ψ(P ) = ψ(P ′). On the other hand, due to the strategy-proofness
of φ, φi(P
′) = ∅.
Let us now consider problem P ′. If there exists no agent j such that ψj(P ′)P ′jφj(P
′)P ′j∅,
then move to Step 2. Otherwise, pick such an agent j. Because φi(P
′) = ∅, j 6= i. By
following the same arguments above, we let agent j truncate his preferences from ψj(P
′)
and write P ′j for this truncated preferences. If we write P
′′ = (P ′i , P
′
j , P−{i,j}), then by the
truncation-invariance of ψ, we have ψ(P ′′) = ψ(P ′) = ψ(P ). On the other hand, because of
the strategy-proofness of φ, φj(P
′′) = ∅
We now consider P ′′. If there exists no agent k such that ψk(P ′′)P ′′k φk(P
′′)P ′′k ∅, then
move to Step 2. Otherwise, we repeat the same arguments to such an agent k. Because
ψ(P ′′) = ψ(P ′) = ψ(P ), under ψ(P ′′), both i and j are assigned to their least preferred
acceptable objects with respect to P ′′i and P
′′
j , respectively. Therefore, k ∈ I \ {i, j}. But
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then, as there are finitely many agents, this case cannot hold all the time. Therefore, we
eventually come up with a preference profile P˜ such that there exists no agent i such that
ψi(P˜ )P˜iφi(P˜ )P˜i∅ and move to Step 2.
Step 2. From Lemma 1, we have either |ψ(P˜ )| > |φ(P˜ )| or |ψ(P˜ )| = |φ(P˜ )|. If the
former is the case, then we reach a contradiction, which finishes the proof. Let us consider
the other case of |ψ(P˜ )| = |φ(P˜ )|.
Let k be the last agent whose preferences is truncated above in obtaining P˜ . Then, we
have φk(P˜ ) = ∅ and ψk(P˜ ) 6= ∅. This, along with |ψ(P˜ )| = |φ(P˜ )|, implies that there exists
an agent i such that ψi(P˜ ) = ∅ and φi(P˜ ) 6= ∅. Moreover, |ψ(P˜ )| = |ψ(P )| < |φ(P )| implies
that there exists an object c such that |ψc(P˜ )| < qc. By the non-wastefulness of ψ, ∅P˜ic.
Let us now consider the object c extension of P˜i and write Pˆi for it. Let Pˆ = (Pˆi, P˜−i).
As ψ is extension-responding, we have ψi(Pˆ ) = c and ψj(Pˆ ) = ψj(P˜ ) for any other agent
j ∈ I \ {i}. Hence, |ψ(Pˆ )| = |ψ(P˜ )|+ 1. On the other hand, from the individual rationality
of φ, φi(P˜ )P˜i∅P˜ic. Therefore, due to the strategy-proofness of φ, φi(Pˆ ) = φi(P˜ ).
As |ψ(Pˆ )| = |ψ(P˜ )| + 1 and |ψ(P˜ )| = |φ(P˜ )|, if |φ(Pˆ )| ≤ |φ(P˜ )|, then |ψ(Pˆ )| > |φ(Pˆ )|,
which yields a contradiction; hence finishing the proof. Suppose |φ(Pˆ )| > |φ(P˜ )|. Without
loss of generality, we assume that there is no agent j such that ψj(Pˆ )Pˆjφj(Pˆ )Pˆj∅. This
supposition is legitimate as, otherwise, we can invoke Step 1 for Pˆ . As, in each preference
truncation iteration within Step 1, we are to truncate a different agent’s preferences and
there are finitely many agents, this case cannot hold all the time.
As there is no agent j such that ψj(Pˆ )Pˆjφj(Pˆ )Pˆj∅, from Lemma 1, we have |ψ(Pˆ )| ≥
|φ(Pˆ )|. If it is strict, then we reach a contradiction, finishing the proof. Hence, suppose
|ψ(Pˆ )| = |φ(Pˆ )|.
As |φ(Pˆ )| > |φ(P˜ )|, there exists an object c such that |φc(Pˆ )| > |φc(P˜ )|. This in turn
implies that for some agent j, φj(Pˆ ) = c and φj(P˜ ) 6= c. Note that as φi(Pˆ ) = φi(P˜ ),
agent j is different than agent i. Moreover, from Lemma 2, we have |ψc′(P˜ )| = |φc′(P˜ )| for
every object c′ ∈ O. This, along with |φc(Pˆ )| > |φc(P˜ )|, implies that |ψc(P˜ )| < qc. Hence,
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by the non-wastefulness of ψ, we have ψj(P˜ )R˜jc. Suppose it is strict. Then, as j 6= i, we
have P˜j = Pˆj. As ψj(Pˆ ) = ψj(P˜ ), we have ψj(Pˆ )Pˆjφj(Pˆ )Pˆj∅, contradicting our supposition
in Step 2. Otherwise, ψj(P˜ ) = c. By invoking Lemma 2, |ψc(P˜ )| = |φc(P˜ )|. Moreover,
φj(P˜ ) 6= c. These imply that there exists an agent h such that φh(P˜ ) = c and ψh(P˜ ) 6= c.
As |ψc(P˜ )| < qc and cP˜h∅ (by the individual rationality of φ), by the non-wastefulness of ψ,
ψh(P˜ )P˜hcP˜h∅, where φh(P˜ ) = c, contradicting our finding in Step 1, finishing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2. Assume for a contradiction that ψ is an individually rational, weakly
population-monotonic, and strategy-proof mechanism that size-wise dominates an efficient
and group strategy-proof mechanism φ. Let P be a problem such that |ψ(P )| > |φ(P )|.
For a matching µ, let U(µ) = {i ∈ I : µi = ∅}, that is, the set of unassigned agents under
matching µ. As efficiency implies non-wastefulness, for any problem P and agent-object pair
(i, c) such that i ∈ U(φ(P )) and |φc(P )| < qc, we have ∅Pic. We do the proof in the following
two steps.
Step 1. As |ψ(P )| > |φ(P )|, there exists an agent i ∈ U(φ(P )) \ U(ψ(P )). From the
non-wastefulness of φ and our supposition that
∑
c∈O qc ≥ |I|, there exists an object c such
that |φc(P )| < qc and ∅Pic.
Let P ′i be the object c extension of Pi, and we write P
′ = (P ′i , P−i). We now claim that
φi(P
′) = c. If it is not, then by the strategy-proofness and the efficiency of φ, φi(P ′) =
φi(P ) = ∅. But then, by invoking group strategy-proofness of φ, φ(P ) = φ(P ′). Hence,
|φc(P ′)| < qc and cP ′i∅, contradicting the non-wastefulness of φ. Therefore, φi(P ′) = c. On
the other hand, by the individual rationality of ψ, ψi(P )Pi∅Pic (recall that i ∈ U(φ(P )) \
U(ψ(P ))). As ψ is strategy-proof, we have ψi(P
′) = ψi(P ). Therefore, ψi(P ′)P ′iφi(P
′)P ′i∅.
Let us now consider P ′. If U(φ(P ′)) \U(ψ(P ′)) = ∅, then we move to Step 2. Otherwise,
We invoke Step 1 for P ′. That is, let k ∈ U(φ(P ′)) \ U(ψ(P ′)). Note that as φi(P ′) 6= ∅,
k 6= i. As ∑c∈O qc ≥ |I|, there exists an object c′ such that |φc′(P ′)| < qc′ and ∅P ′kc′ (note
that P ′k = Pk). Let P
′′
k be the object c
′ extension of P ′k, and we write P
′′ = (P ′i , P
′′
k , P−{i,k}).
Then, by the same arguments above, we have φk(P
′′) = c′ and ψk(P ′′)P ′′k φk(P
′′)P ′′k ∅.
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We next consider P ′′. If U(φ(P ′′))\U(ψ(P ′′)) = ∅, then we move to Step 2. Otherwise, we
repeat Step 1 for P ′′. In each iteration of Step 1, we pick someone who is unassigned under
φ yet assigned under ψ and extend his preferences by adding an object to his acceptable
set. However, as both the agents and objects are finite, this case cannot hold all the time.
Therefore, we eventually come up with a preference profile P˜ such that U(φ(P˜ ))\U(ψ(P˜ )) =
∅. Moreover, for the last agent whose preferences is extended in obtaining P˜ , say agent `,
we have ψ`(P˜ )P˜`φ`(P˜ )P˜`∅.
Step 2. As U(φ(P˜ )) \ U(ψ(P˜ )) = ∅ and |ψ(P˜ )| ≥ |φ(P˜ )|, we have U(φ(P˜ )) = U(ψ(P˜ )).
Let us now construct a new problem Pˆ as follows. For any agent i /∈ U(φ(P˜ )), Pˆi = P˜i;
and for any j ∈ U(φ(P˜ )), ∅Pˆjc for every c ∈ O. By the efficiency and the group strategy-
proofness of φ, φ(Pˆ ) = φ(P˜ ). On the other hand, by the weak population-monotonicity of
ψ, ψi(Pˆ )R˜iψi(P˜ )P˜i∅ for any i /∈ U(ψ(P˜ )), and by the individual rationality of ψ, ψj(Pˆ ) = ∅
for any j ∈ U(ψ(P˜ )).
In Step 1, we find that ψ`(P˜ )P˜`φ`(P˜ )P˜`∅. From above, ψ`(Pˆ )R˜`ψ`(P˜ ) and φ`(Pˆ ) = φ`(P˜ ).
Hence, ψ`(Pˆ )Pˆ`φ`(Pˆ ) (note that by construction, P˜` = Pˆ`). As φ is efficient, it implies that
there exists an agent i such that φi(Pˆ )Pˆiψi(Pˆ ). Moreover, because U(φ(Pˆ )) = U(ψ(Pˆ )) and
ψ is individually rational, ψi(Pˆ )Pˆi∅.
Let P¯i be the truncation of Pˆi from φi(Pˆ ). Let P¯ = (P¯i, Pˆ−i). By the group strategy-
proofness of φ, we have φ(P¯ ) = φ(Pˆ ). By the strategy-proofness of ψ, ψi(P¯ ) = ∅. This,
along with the individual rationality of ψ, implies that |ψ(P¯ )| < |ψ(Pˆ )| = |φ(Pˆ )| = |φ(P¯ )|,
contradicting our starting supposition that ψ size-wise dominates φ.
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